← Previous day

Next day →
Plain-English daily brief

What changed on this day

18 changes were tracked across 3 Microsoft Entra products. The leading updates include 21806; Mandatory Multifactor Authentication; 21799.

18 updates

Authentication

6

21806

Updated

Without Conditional Access policies protecting security information registration, threat actors can exploit unprotected registration flows to compromise authentication methods. When users register multifactor authentication and self-service password reset methods without proper controls, threat actors can intercept these registration sessions through adversary-in-the-middle attacks or exploit unmanaged devices accessing registration from untrusted locations. Once threat actors gain access to an unprotected registration flow, they can register their own authentication methods, effectively hijacking the target's authentication profile. The threat actors can bypass security controls and potentially escalate privileges throughout the environment because they can maintain persistent access by controlling the MFA methods. The compromised authentication methods then become the foundation for lateral movement as threat actors can authenticate as the legitimate user across multiple services and applications.

21781

Updated

- [Get started with a phishing-resistant passwordless authentication deployment](/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-plan-prerequisites-phishing-resistant-passwordless-authentication)

21782

Updated

- [Get started with a phishing-resistant passwordless authentication deployment](/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-plan-prerequisites-phishing-resistant-passwordless-authentication)

21783

Updated

- [Get started with a phishing-resistant passwordless authentication deployment](/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-plan-prerequisites-phishing-resistant-passwordless-authentication)

21800

Updated

- [Deploy multifactor authentication](/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-getstarted)

21801

Updated

- [Deploy multifactor authentication](/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-getstarted)

Troubleshooting

4

21796

Updated

**Remediation action**

21808

Updated

**Remediation action**

21851

Updated

**Remediation action**

21872

Updated

**Remediation action**

Fundamentals

3

Block authentication flows with Conditional Access policy

Updated

The following steps help create Conditional Access policies to restrict how [device code flow](concept-authentication-flows.md#device-code-flow) and [authentication transfer](concept-authentication-flows.md#authentication-transfer) are used within your organization.

Plan Conditional Access

Updated

Start with a few core Conditional Access policies like the ones that follow. Many policies are available as [Conditional Access policy templates](concept-conditional-access-policy-common.md). By default, each policy created from a template is in report-only mode. Test and monitor usage, to ensure the intended result, before turning on each policy.

Standards

2

21828

Updated

Blocking authentication transfer in Microsoft Entra ID is a critical security control. It helps protect against token theft and replay attacks by preventing the use of device tokens to silently authenticate on other devices or browsers. When authentication transfer is enabled, a threat actor who gains access to one device can access resources to nonapproved devices, bypassing standard authentication and device compliance checks. When administrators block this flow, organizations can ensure that each authentication request must originate from the original device, maintaining the integrity of the device compliance and user session context.

userimpact: High

Updated

Assume high risk users are compromised by threat actors. Without investigation and remediation, threat actors can execute scripts, deploy malicious applications, or manipulate API calls to establish persistence, based on the potentially compromised user's permissions. Threat actors can then exploit misconfigurations or abuse OAuth tokens to move laterally across workloads like documents, SaaS applications, or Azure resources. Threat actors can gain access to sensitive files, customer records, or proprietary code and exfiltrate it to external repositories while maintaining stealth through legitimate cloud services. Finally, threat actors might disrupt operations by modifying configurations, encrypting data for ransom, or using the stolen information for further attacks, resulting in financial, reputational, and regulatory consequences.

Security

1

21786

Updated

Token protection, also called token binding, helps prevent token theft by making sure a token is usable only from the intended device. Token protection uses cryptography so that without the client device key, no one can use the token.

Authentication

1

21799

Updated

When high-risk sign-ins are not properly restricted through Conditional Access policies, organizations expose themselves to security vulnerabilities. Threat actors can exploit these gaps for initial access through compromised credentials, credential stuffing attacks, or anomalous sign-in patterns that Microsoft Entra ID Protection identifies as risky behaviors. Without appropriate restrictions, threat actors who successfully authenticate during high-risk scenarios can perform privilege escalation by misusing the authenticated session to access sensitive resources, modify security configurations, or conduct reconnaissance activities within the environment. Once threat actors establish access through uncontrolled high-risk sign-ins, they can achieve persistence by creating additional accounts, installing backdoors, or modifying authentication policies to maintain long-term access to the organization's resources. The unrestricted access enables threat actors to conduct lateral movement across systems and applications using the authenticated session, potentially accessing sensitive data stores, administrative interfaces, or critical business applications. Finally, threat actors achieve impact through data exfiltration, or compromise business-critical systems while maintaining plausible deniability by exploiting the fact that their risky authentication was not properly challenged or blocked.

Security

1